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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44254 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-648 
v.     ) 
     ) 
MIGUEL MARQUEZ,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Miguel Marquez contends the district court abused its discretion when it 
relinquished jurisdiction in his case.  He asserts a sufficient consideration all the 
mitigating factors in the record reveals a period of probation would better serve all the 
goals of sentencing.  As such, this Court should reverse the order relinquishing 
jurisdiction and remand this case so that Mr. Marquez can be placed on probation. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Marquez pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine, and the State originally agreed to recommend a unified sentence of 
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five years, with two years fixed, which would be suspended for a period of probation 
while Mr. Marquez participated in the drug court program.  (Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.2; 
R., pp.39-41.)  Alternatively, if drug court were not an option, the State agreed to 
recommend a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-4.)  Mr. Marquez was not 
accepted into drug court because he had another pending case in Lincoln County.  
(R., p.59.)  He subsequently applied for mental health court, but that application was 
denied after Mr. Marquez missed his assessment interview.  (R., pp.66-68, 78.)   
 Around that same time, Mr. Marquez had a confrontation with officers, in which it 
appeared he was attempting “suicide by police officer.”1  (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-20; p.28, 
Ls.22-24.)  As a result, defense counsel requested the district court order a 
psychological evaluation in anticipation of sentencing, which the district court did.  
(Tr., p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.10; R., pp.89-90.)  That evaluation determined “substance use 
is Mr. Marquez’s primary problem with respect to his adaptive functioning across 
multiple domains.”  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.125.)  
However, it also diagnosed Mr. Marquez with major depressive disorder, and gave a 
rule-out diagnosis for antisocial personality disorder.  (PSI, p.124.) 
 At sentencing, the district court clarified that Mr. Marquez had been acquitted in 
the Lincoln County case.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.)  That meant, as defense counsel pointed 
out, the instant offense was Mr. Marquez’s first felony conviction.  (Tr., p.28, L.8.)  
Nevertheless, defense counsel acknowledged probation was not appropriate at that 
                                            
1 According to defense counsel, that incident resulted in a separate case in which 
Mr. Marquez was charged with several misdemeanors, and that Mr. Marquez 
anticipated resolving that case with sentences ordered to be served concurrent with his 
sentence in this case.  (See Tr., p.29, Ls.2-4.)  That other case is not included in this 
appeal.  (See, e.g., R., pp.123-24.)   
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particular point in time and recommended the district court retain jurisdiction instead.  
(Tr., p.10, Ls.10-20, p.29, Ls.14-23.)  The State also, and without objection, departed 
from the plea agreement, recommending the district court impose and execute a unified 
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.  (Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.22, L.13.)  The district 
court acknowledged Mr. Marquez’s young age (25 years old (PSI, p.1)), and his 
rehabilitative potential.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.1-25.)  However, it concluded there were too many 
coinciding issues to justify probation at that time.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.17-23.)  As such, it 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.35, Ls.9-13; R., pp.96-99.) 
 According to the program staff, Mr. Marquez struggled to engage fully in the 
classes during his period of retained jurisdiction.  (PSI, p.116.)  He also received two 
formal disciplinary reports and two other informal sanctions.  (PSI, pp.112-13.)  The 
district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing.  (R., pp.111-13.)  
Thereafter, Mr. Marquez filed a motion requesting the district court reconsider its 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction, and he requested a hearing so that he could explain 
what happened during his rider program.  (R., p.115.)  A letter he wrote to defense 
counsel was attached to that motion, and in that letter, Mr. Marquez pointed out that he 
had taken responsibility for the conduct which led to his disciplinary sanctions, and he 
explained that he had been learning pro-social skills while in the rider program and he 
had been applying them in his daily life.  (R., pp.117-18.)  Still, the district court denied 
that motion to reconsider without a hearing.  (R., pp.120-21.)  Mr. Marquez then filed a 
notice of appeal which was timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.111, 123.)   
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ISSUE 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Marquez 
 
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard.  State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001); State v. Hurst, 151 
Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011).  Such a decision will not be considered an abuse of 
discretion “if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended 
sentence and probation would be inappropriate.”  State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 
(1998).  “The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the 
trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and 
suitability for probation.”  State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990).  In making 
that determination, the district court “considers all of the circumstances to assess the 
defendant’s ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to determine the 
course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of society, 
deterrence, and retribution.”  Statton, 136 Idaho at 137.  In this regard, the need to 
protect society is the primary objective the court should consider.  See, e.g., State v. 
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also 
held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the 
criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other 
grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). 
In this case, it is important to remember that the parties initially agreed that a 
period of probation was an appropriate sentence for this case.  (Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.2; 
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R., pp.39-41.)  The reason for that was the parties agreed the drug court would provide 
the best treatment for Mr. Marquez (i.e., it would provide the best opportunity for 
rehabilitation and long-term protection of society).  (See Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.2.)  That 
was an appropriate conclusion because, as the psychological evaluation would later 
make clear, it is Mr. Marquez’s substance abuse issues that are the primary issue which 
needs to be addressed in this rehabilitative efforts.  (PSI, p.125.)  It is also important to 
recognize that the reason he was denied the opportunity to participate in that program is 
that he was dealing with another pending case, and he was ultimately acquitted in that 
other case.  (R., p.59; Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.)  Thus, in looking at Mr. Marquez’s actions and 
his immediate needs surrounding them, probation was the appropriate sentence.  
See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229-30 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that, 
while the district court can consider a wide range of information in sentencing, its focus 
should be on addressing the acts in the case before it).   
With that starting point, Mr. Marquez acknowledges there were other factors 
which were properly considered at the initial sentencing hearing and which indicated 
that probation was not appropriate at that time.  (See Tr., p.10, Ls.10-20, p.29, 
Ls.14-23.)  It is also true that he struggled at times during his period of retained 
jurisdiction.  (PSI, pp.112-13, 116.)  However, as the letter attached to Mr. Marquez’s 
motion to reconsider relinquishing jurisdiction reveals, he was trying to make progress in 
learning pro-social lessons during the rider program.  (R., p.117.)  Since rehabilitation is 
a process, while he may not have always been successful in his efforts toward that goal, 
the fact that he was making those efforts merits consideration.   
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For example, he accepted responsibility for his inappropriate behaviors in the 
rider program.  (R., p.117; see PSI, pp.112-13.)  Acceptance of responsibility is a critical 
first step toward rehabilitation.  See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010).  
That he has taken those first steps is important because he is still young (PSI, p.25), 
and this is also his first felony conviction (Tr., p.28, L.8), both of which indicate leniency 
in sentencing is appropriate as both highlight his potential to successfully rehabilitate. 
See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).  Mr. Marquez also has the 
support of his family.  (PSI, p.10.)  For example, his father offered Mr. Marquez a place 
to stay on probation, as well as assistance in getting to drug court classes or Narcotics 
Anonymous meetings.  (PSI, p.10.)  Family constitutes an important part of a support 
network, which also makes successful rehabilitation more likely.  See Kellis, 148 Idaho 
at 817.  Successful rehabilitation is important since, by addressing the underlying 
issues, society is better protected in the long term. 
Therefore, an adequate consideration of all the mitigating factors in this record, 
particularly in light of the initial recommendations in this case, reveals that, despite his 
struggles in the rider program, probation was still the sentencing option which best 
served all the goals of sentencing in Mr. Marquez’s case.  As such, the district court 














Mr. Marquez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order relinquishing 
jurisdiction and remand this case so he may be released on probation. 
 DATED this 27th day of October, 2016. 
      ______/S/___________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of October, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 





PO BOX 14 
BOISE ID 83707 
  
JONATHAN BRODY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED 
 
DENNIS R BYINGTON 
MINI-CASSIA PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE 
E-MAILED 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 





      __/S/_______________________ 
      MAGALI CEJA 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
BRD/mc 
